

Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles—a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal,—what is all this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and every form of vice?

Exactly so.

And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?

What do you mean? he said.

Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.

How so? he said.

Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.

Yes.

And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?

That is certain.

And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?

True.

And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order?

Exactly so, he said.

Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice the disease and weakness and deformity of the same?

True.

And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?

Assuredly.

Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?

In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them both to be such as we have described?

Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous.

## 4. Existential Man

Jean-Paul Sartre

Many people are going to be surprised at what is said here about humanism. We shall try to see in what sense it is to be understood. In any case, what can be said from the very beginning, is that by existentialism we mean a doctrine which makes human life possible and, in addition, declares that every truth and every action implies a human setting and a human subjectivity.

... What they (existentialists) have in common is that they think that existence precedes essence, or, if you prefer, that subjectivity must be the starting point.

Just what does that mean? Let us consider some object that is manufactured, for example, a book or a paper-cutter: here is an object which has been made by an artisan whose inspiration came from a concept. He referred to the concept of what a paper-cutter is and likewise to a known method of production, which is part of the concept, something which is, by and large, a routine. Thus, the paper-cutter is at once an object produced in a certain way and, on the other hand, one having a specific use; and one can not postulate a man who produces a paper-cutter but does not know what it is used for. Therefore, let us say that, for the paper-cutter, essence—that is, the ensemble of both the production routines and the properties which enable it to be both produced and defined—precedes existence. Thus, the presence of the paper-cutter or book in front of me is determined. Therefore, we have here a technical view of the world whereby it can be said that production precedes existence.

When we conceive God as the Creator, He is generally thought of as a superior sort of artisan. Whatever doctrine we may be considering, whether one like that of Descartes or that of Leibnitz, we always grant that will more or less follows understanding or, at the very least, accompanies it, and that when God creates He knows exactly what He is creating. Thus, the concept of man in the mind of God is comparable to the concept of paper-cutter in the mind of the manufacturer, and, following certain techniques and a conception, God produces man, just as the artisan, following a definition and a technique, makes a paper-cutter. Thus, the individual man is the realization of a certain concept in the divine intelligence. . . .

Atheistic existentialism, which I represent, is more coherent. It states that if God does not exist, there is at least one being in whom existence precedes essence, a being who exists before he can be defined by any concept, and that this being is man, or, as Heidegger says, human reality. What is meant here by saying that existence precedes essence? It means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself. If man, as the existentialist conceives him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be. Thus, there is no human nature, since there is no God to conceive it. Not only is man what he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence.

Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself. Such is the first principle of existentialism. It is also what is called subjectivity, the name we are labeled with when charges are brought against us. But what do we mean by this, if not that man has a greater dignity than a stone or table? For we mean that man first exists, that is, that man first of all is the being who hurls himself toward a future and who is conscious of imagining himself as being in the future. Man is at the start a plan which is aware of itself, rather than a patch of moss, a piece of garbage, or a cauliflower: nothing exists prior to this plan; there is nothing in heaven; man will be what he will have planned to be. Not what he will want to be. Because by the word "will" we generally mean a conscious decision, which is subsequent to what we have already made of ourselves. I may want to belong to a political party, write a book, get married; but all that is only a manifestation of an earlier, more spontaneous choice that is called "will." But if existence really does precede essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, existentialism's first move is to make every man aware of what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on him. And when we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.

The word subjectivism has two meanings, and our opponents play on the two. Subjectivism means, on the one hand, that an individual chooses and makes himself; and, on the other, that it is impossible for man to transcend human subjectivity. The second of these is the essential meaning of existentialism. When we say that man chooses his own self, we mean that every one of us does likewise; but we also mean by that that in making this choice he also chooses all men. In fact, in creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be. To choose to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose, because we can never choose evil. We always choose the good, and nothing can be good for us without being good for all.

If, on the other hand, existence precedes essence, and if we grant that we exist and fashion our image at one and the same time, the image is valid for everybody and for our whole age. Thus, our responsibility is much greater than we might have supposed, because it involves all mankind. If I am a workman and choose to join a Christian trade-union rather than be a communist, and if by being a member I want to show that the best thing for man is resignation, that the kingdom of man is not of this world, I am not only involving my own case—I want to be resigned for everyone. As a result, my action has involved all humanity. To take a more individual matter, if I want to marry, to have children; even if this marriage depends solely on my own circumstances or passion or wish, I am involving all humanity in monogamy and not merely myself. Therefore, I am responsible for myself and for everyone else. I am creating a certain image of man of my own choosing. In choosing myself, I choose man.

This helps us understand what the actual content is of such rather grandiloquent words as anguish, forlornness, despair. As you will see, it's all quite simple.

First, what is meant by anguish? The existentialists say at once that man is anguish. What that means is this: the man who involves himself and who realizes that he is not only the person he chooses to be, but also a law-maker who is, at the same time, choosing all mankind as well as himself, can not help escape the feeling of his total and deep responsibility. Of course, there are many people who are not anxious; but we claim that they are hiding their anxiety, that they are fleeing from it. Certainly, many people believe that when they do something, they themselves are the only ones involved, and when someone says to them, "What if everyone acted that way?" they

shrug their shoulders and answer, "Everyone doesn't act that way." But really, one should always ask himself, "What would happen if everybody looked at things that way?" There is no escaping this disturbing thought except by a kind of double-dealing. A man who lies and makes excuses for himself by saying "not everybody does that," is someone with an uneasy conscience, because the act of lying implies that a universal value is conferred upon the lie. . . .

When we speak of forlornness, a term Heidegger was fond of, we mean only that God does not exist and that we have to face all the consequences of this. The existentialist is strongly opposed to a certain kind of secular ethics which would like to abolish God with the least possible expense. . . .

The existentialist, on the contrary, thinks it very distressing that God does not exist, because all possibility of finding values in a heaven of ideas disappears along with Him; there can no longer be an *a priori* Good, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. Nowhere is it written that the Good exists, that we must be honest, that we must not lie; because the fact is we are on a plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky said, "If God didn't exist, everything would be possible." That is the very starting point of existentialism. Indeed, everything is permissible if God does not exist, and as a result man is forlorn, because neither within him nor without does he find anything to cling to. He can't start making excuses for himself.

If existence really does precede essence, there is no explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given human nature. In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom. On the other hand, if God does not exist, we find no values or commands to turn to which legitimize our conduct. So, in the bright realm of values, we have no excuse behind us, nor justification before us. We are alone, with no excuses.

That is the idea I shall try to convey when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet, in other respects is free; because, once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does. The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion. He will never agree that a sweeping passion is a ravaging torrent which fatally leads a man to certain acts and is therefore an excuse. He thinks that man is responsible for his passion.

The existentialist does not think that man is going to help himself by finding in the world some omen by which to orient himself. Because he thinks that man will interpret the omen to suit himself. . . .

No general ethics can show you what is to be done; there are no omens in the world. The Catholics will reply, "But there are." Granted—but, in any case, I myself choose the meaning they have.

When I was a prisoner, I knew a rather remarkable young man who was a Jesuit. He had entered the Jesuit order in the following way: he had had a number of very bad breaks; in childhood, his father died, leaving him in poverty, and he was a scholarship student at a religious institution where he was constantly made to feel that he was being kept out of charity; then, he failed to get any of the honors and distinctions that children like; later on, at about eighteen, he bungled a love affair; finally, at twenty-two, he failed in military training, a childish enough matter, but it was the last straw.

This young fellow might well have felt that he had botched everything. It was a sign of something, but of what? He might have taken refuge in bitterness or despair. But he very wisely

looked upon all this as a sign that he was not made for secular triumphs, and that only the triumphs of religion, holiness, and faith were open to him. He saw the hand of God in all this, and so he entered the order. Who can help seeing that he alone decided what the sign meant?

Some other interpretation might have been drawn from this series of setbacks; for example, that he might have done better to turn carpenter or revolutionist. Therefore, he is fully responsible for the interpretation. Forlornness implies that we ourselves choose our being. Forlornness and anguish go together.

As for despair, the term has a very simple meaning. It means that we shall confine ourselves to reckoning only with what depends upon our will, or on the ensemble of probabilities which make our action possible. When we want something, we always have to reckon with probabilities. I may be counting on the arrival of a friend. The friend is coming by rail or street-car; this supposes that the train will arrive on schedule, or that the street-car will not jump the track. I am left in the realm of possibility; but possibilities are to be reckoned with only to the point where my action comports with the ensemble of these possibilities, and no further. The moment the possibilities I am considering are not rigorously involved by my action, I ought to disengage myself from them, because no God, no scheme, can adapt the world and its possibilities to my will. When Descartes said, "Conquer yourself rather than the world," he meant essentially the same thing.

The Marxists to whom I have spoken reply, "You can rely on the support of others in your action, which obviously has certain limits because you're not going to live forever. That means: rely on both what others are doing elsewhere to help you, in China, in Russia, and what they will do later on, after your death, to carry on the action and lead it to its fulfillment, which will be the revolution. You even *have* to rely upon that, otherwise you're immoral." I reply at once that I will always rely on fellow-fighters insofar as these comrades are involved with me in a common struggle, in the unity of a party or a group in which I can more or less make my weight felt; that is, one whose ranks I am in as a fighter and whose movements I am aware of at every moment. In such a situation, relying on the unity and will of the party is exactly like counting on the fact that the train will arrive on time or that the car won't jump the track. But, given that man is free and that there is no human nature for me to depend on, I can not count on men whom I do not know by relying on human goodness or man's concern for the good of society. . . .

Nevertheless, on the basis of a few notions like these, we are still charged with immuring man in his private subjectivity. There again we're very much misunderstood. Subjectivity of the individual is indeed our point of departure, and this for strictly philosophic reasons. Not because we are bourgeois, but because we want a doctrine based on truth and not a lot of fine theories, full of hope but with no real basis. There can be no other truth to take off from than this: *I think, therefore, I exist*. There we have the absolute truth of consciousness becoming aware of itself. Every theory which takes man out of the moment in which he becomes aware of himself is, at its very beginning, a theory which confounds truth, for outside the Cartesian *cogito*, all views are only probable, and a doctrine of probability which is not bound to a truth dissolves into thin air. In order to describe the probable, you must have a firm hold on the true. Therefore, before there can be any truth whatsoever, there must be an absolute truth; and this one is simple and easily arrived at; it's on everyone's doorstep; it's a matter of grasping it directly.

Secondly, this theory is the only one which gives man dignity, the only one which does not reduce him to an object. The effect of all materialism is to treat all men, including the one philosophizing, as objects, that is, as an ensemble of determined reactions in no way distinguished

from the ensemble of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table or a chair or a stone. We definitely wish to establish the human realm as an ensemble of values distinct from the material realm. But the subjectivity that we have thus arrived at, and which we have claimed to be truth, is not a strictly individual subjectivity, for we have demonstrated that one discovers in the *cogito* not only himself, but others as well.

The philosophies of Descartes and Kant to the contrary, through the *I think* we reach our own self in the presence of others, and the others are just as real to us as our own self. Thus, the man who becomes aware of himself through the *cogito* also perceives all others, and he perceives them as the condition of his own existence. He realizes that he can not be anything (in the sense that we say that someone is witty or nasty or jealous) unless others recognize it as such. In order to get any truth about myself, I must have contact with another person. The other is indispensable to my own existence, as well as to my knowledge about myself. This being so, in discovering my inner being I discover the other person at the same time, like a freedom placed in front of me which thinks and wills only for or against me. Hence, let us at once announce the discovery of a world which we shall call intersubjectivity: this is the world in which man decides what he is and what others are.

Besides, if it is impossible to find in every man some universal essence which would be human nature, yet there does exist a universal human condition. It's not by chance that today's thinkers speak more readily of man's condition than of his nature. By condition they mean, more or less definitely, the *a priori* limits which outline man's fundamental situation in the universe. Historical situations vary; a man may be born a slave in a pagan society or a feudal lord or a proletarian. What does not vary is the necessity for him to exist in the world, to be at work there, to be there in the midst of other people, and to be mortal there. The limits are neither subjective nor objective, or, rather, they have an objective and a subjective side. Objective because they are to be found everywhere and are recognizable everywhere; subjective because they are *lived* and are nothing if man does not live them, that is, freely determine his existence with reference to them. And though the configurations may differ, at least none of them are completely strange to me, because they all appear as attempts either to pass beyond these limits or recede from them or deny them or adapt to them. Consequently, every configuration, however individual it may be, has a universal value.

Every configuration, even the Chinese, the Indian, or the Negro, can be understood by a Westerner. "Can be understood" means that by virtue of a situation that he can imagine, a European of 1945 can, in like manner, push himself to his limits and reconstitute within himself the configuration of the Chinese, the Indian, or the African. Every configuration has universality in the sense that every configuration can be understood by every man. This does not at all mean that this configuration defines man forever, but that it can be met with again. There is always a way to understand the idiot, the child, the savage, the foreigner, provided one has the necessary information.

In this sense we may say that there is a universality of man; but it is not given, it is perpetually being made. I build the universal in choosing myself; I build it in understanding the configuration of every other man, whatever age he might have lived in. This absoluteness of choice does not do away with the relativeness of each epoch. At heart, what existentialism shows is the connection

between the absolute character of free involvement, by virtue of which every man realizes himself in realizing a type of mankind, an involvement always comprehensible in any age whatsoever and by any person whatsoever. . . .

In one sense choice is possible, but what is not possible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I ought to know that if I do not choose, I am still choosing. Though this may seem purely formal, it is highly important for keeping fantasy and caprice within bounds. If it is true that in facing a situation, for example, one in which, as a person capable of having sexual relations, of having children, I am obliged to choose an attitude, and if I in any way assume responsibility for a choice which, in involving myself, also involves all mankind, this has nothing to do with caprice, even if no *a priori* value determines my choice. . . .

But, nevertheless, one can still pass judgment for, as I have said, one makes a choice in relationship to others. First, one can judge (and this is perhaps not a judgment of value but a logical judgment) that certain choices are based on error and others on truth. If we have defined man's situation as a free choice, with no excuses and no recourse, every man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his passions, every man who sets up a determinism, is a dishonest man.

The objection may be raised, "But why mayn't he choose himself dishonestly?" I reply that I am not obliged to pass moral judgment on him, but that I do define his dishonesty as an error. One can not help considering the truth of the matter. Dishonesty is obviously a falsehood because it belies the complete freedom of involvement. On the same grounds, I maintain that there is also dishonesty if I choose to state that certain values exist prior to me; it is self-contradictory for me to want them and at the same state that they are imposed on me. Suppose someone says to me, "What if I want to be dishonest?" I'll answer, "There's no reason for you not to be, but I'm saying that that's what you are, and that the strictly coherent attitude is that of honesty."

Besides, I can bring moral judgment to bear. When I declare that freedom in every concrete circumstance can have no other aim than to want itself, if man has once become aware that in his forlornness he imposes values, he can no longer want but one thing, and that is freedom, as the basis of all values. That doesn't mean that he wants it in the abstract. It means simply that the ultimate meaning of the acts of honest men is the quest for freedom as such. A man who belongs to a communist or revolutionary union wants concrete goals; these goals imply an abstract desire for freedom; but this freedom is wanted in something concrete. We want freedom for freedom's sake and in every particular circumstance. And in wanting freedom we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others, and that the freedom of others depends on ours. Of course, freedom as the definition of man does not depend on others, but as soon as there is involvement, I am obliged to want others to have freedom at the same time that I want my own freedom. I can take freedom as my goal only if I take that of others as a goal as well. Consequently, when, in all honesty, I've recognized that man is a being in whom existence precedes essence, that he is a free being who, in various circumstances, can want only his freedom, I have at the same time recognized that I can want only the freedom of others.

Therefore, in the name of this will for freedom, which freedom itself implies, I may pass judgment on those who seek to hide from themselves the complete arbitrariness and the complete freedom of their existence. Those who hide their complete freedom from themselves out of a spirit of seriousness or by means of deterministic excuses, I shall call cowards; those who try to show that their existence was necessary, when it is the very contingency of man's appearance on earth, I shall call stinkers. But cowards or stinkers can be judged only from a strictly unbiased point of view.

Therefore though the content of ethics is variable, a certain form of it is universal. Kant says that freedom desires both itself and the freedom of others. Granted. But he believes that the formal and the universal are enough to constitute an ethics. We, on the other hand, think that principles which are too abstract run aground in trying to decide action. Once again, take the case of the student. In the name of what, in the name of what great moral maxim do you think he could have decided, in perfect peace of mind, to abandon his mother or to stay with her? There is no way of judging. The content is always concrete and thereby unforeseeable; there is always the element of invention. The one thing that counts is knowing whether the inventing that has been done, has been done in the name of freedom. . . .

By humanism one can mean a theory which takes man as an end and as a higher value. Humanism in this sense can be found in Cocteau's tale *Around the World in Eighty Hours* when a character, because he is flying over some mountains in an airplane, declares, "Man is simply amazing." That means that I, who did not build the airplanes, shall personally benefit from these particular inventions, and that I, as man, shall personally consider myself responsible for, and honored by, acts of a few particular men. This would imply that we ascribe a value to man on the basis of the highest deeds of certain men. This humanism is absurd, because only the dog or the horse would be able to make such an over-all judgment about man, which they are careful not to do, at least to my knowledge.

But it can not be granted that a man may make a judgment about man. Existentialism spares him from any such judgment. The existentialist will never consider man as an end because he is always in the making. Nor should we believe that there is a mankind to which we might set up a cult in the manner of Auguste Comte. The cult of mankind ends in the self-enclosed humanism of Comte, and, let it be said, of fascism. This kind of humanism we can do without.

But there is another meaning of humanism. Fundamentally it is this: man is constantly outside of himself; in projecting himself, in losing himself outside of himself, he makes for man's existing; and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent goals that he is able to exist; man, being this state of passing-beyond, and seizing upon things only as they bear upon this passing-beyond, is at the heart, at the center of this passing-beyond. There is no universe other than a human universe, the universe of human subjectivity. This connection between transcendency, as a constituent element of man—not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of passing beyond—and subjectivity, in the sense that man is not closed in on himself but is always present in a human universe, is what we call existentialism humanism. Humanism, because we remind man that there is no law-maker other than himself, and that in his forlornness he will decide by himself; because we point out that man will fulfill himself as man, not in turning toward himself, but in seeking outside of himself a goal which is just this liberation, just this particular fulfillment. . . .

Existentialism is nothing else than an attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent atheistic position. It isn't trying to plunge man into despair at all. But if one calls every attitude of unbelief despair, like the Christians, then the word is not being used in its original sense. Existentialism isn't so atheistic that it wears itself out showing that God doesn't exist. Rather, it declares that even if God did exist, that would change nothing. There you've got our point of view. Not that we believe that God exists, but we think that the problem of His existence is not the issue. In this sense existentialism is optimistic, a doctrine of action. . . .

## 7. Man Transcending

Friedrich Nietzsche

Having attained the age of thirty, Zarathustra left his home and went into the mountains. There he rejoiced in his spirit and his loneliness and, for ten years, did not grow weary of it. But at last his heart turned—one morning he got up with the dawn, stepped into the presence of the Sun, and thus spake unto him:

"Thou great star! What would be thy happiness, were it not for those for whom thou shinest. For ten years thou hast come up here to my cave. Thou wouldst have got sick of thy light and thy journey but for me, mine eagle, and my serpent.

But we waited for thee every morning and, receiving from thee thine abundance, blessed thee for it.

Lo! I am weary of my wisdom, like the bee that hath collected too much honey; I need hands reaching out for it.

I would fain grant and distribute until the wise among men could once more enjoy their folly, and the poor once more their riches.

For that end I must descend to the depth: as thou dost at even, when, sinking behind the sea, thou givest light to the lower regions, thou resplendent star!

I must, like thee, go down, as men say—men to whom I would descend.

Then bless me, thou impassive eye that canst look without envy even upon over-much happiness!

Bless the cup which is about to overflow so that the water golden-flowing out of it may carry everywhere the reflection of thy rapture.

Lo! This cup is about to empty itself again, and Zarathustra will once more become a man."

Thus Zarathustra's going down began.

Arriving at the next town which lieth nigh the forests, Zarathustra found there many folk gathered in the market; for a performance had been promised by a rope-dancer. And Zarathustra thus spake unto the folk:

"*I teach you beyond-man.* Man is a something that shall be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass him?"

All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and are ye going to be the ebb of this great tide and rather revert to the animal than surpass man?

What with man is the ape? A joke or a sore shame. Man shall be the same for beyond-man, a joke or a sore shame.

Ye have made your way from worm to man, and much within you is still worm. Once ye were apes, even now man is ape in a higher degree than any ape.

He who is the wisest among you is but a discord and hybrid of plant and ghost. But do I order you to become ghosts or plants?

Behold, I teach you beyond-man!

Beyond-man is the significance of earth. Your will shall say: beyond-man shall be the significance of earth.

From *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, translated by Alexander Tille, 1896.

I conjure you, my brethren, *remain faithful to earth* and do not believe those who speak unto you of superterrestrial hopes! Poisoners they are whether they know it or not.

Despisers of life they are, decaying and themselves poisoned, of whom earth is weary: begone with them!

Once the offence against God was the greatest offence, but God died, so that these offenders died also. Now the most terrible of things is to offend earth and rate the intestines of the inscrutable higher than the significance of the earth!

Once soul looked contemptuously upon body; that contempt then being the highest ideal!—soul wished the body meagre, hideous, starved. Thus the soul thought it could escape body and earth.

Oh! that soul was itself meagre, hideous, starved: cruelty was the lust of that soul!

But ye also, my brethren, speak: what telleth your body of your soul? Is your soul not poverty and dirt and a miserable ease?

Verily, a muddy stream is man. One must be a sea to be able to receive a muddy stream without becoming unclean.

Behold, I teach you beyond-man: he is that sea, in him your great contempt can sink."

But Zarathustra looked at the folk and wondered. Then he spake thus:

"Man is a rope connecting animal and beyond-man,—a rope over a precipice.

Dangerous over, dangerous on-the-way, dangerous looking backward, dangerous shivering and making a stand.

What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal: what can be loved in man is that

he is a *transition* and a *destruction*.

I love those who do not know how to live unless in perishing, for they are those going beyond. I love the great despisers because they are the great adores, they are arrows of longing for the other shore.

I love those who do not seek behind the stars for a reason to perish and be sacrificed, but who sacrifice themselves to earth in order that earth may someday become beyond-man's.

I love him whose soul is over-full so that he forgetteth himself and all things are within him: thus all things become his destruction.

I love him who is of a free spirit and of a free heart: thus his head is merely the intestine of his heart, but his heart driveth him to destruction.

I love all those who are like heavy drops falling one by one from the dark cloud lowering over men: they announce the coming of the lightning and perish in the announcing.

Behold, I am an announcer of the lightning and a heavy drop from the clouds: that lightning's name is *beyond-man*."

But in order that ye may understand my word of good and evil, I shall tell you my word of life and of all kinds of living things.

I pursued living things, I walked on the broadest and the narrowest paths to perceive their kin.

With an hundredfold mirror I caught their glance when their mouth was shut, in order to hear their eye speak. And their eye spake unto me.

But wherever I found living things, there also I heard the speech of obedience. All living things are things that obey.

And this is the second: he is commanded who cannot obey his own self. This is the way of



But this is the third I heard: to command is more difficult than to obey. And not only that the commander beareth the burden of all who obey, and that this burden easily crusheth him;—An effort and a jeopardy appeared unto me to be contained in all commanding; and whenever living things command they risk themselves.

Nay even, when they command themselves: even there they have to atone for their commanding. For their own law they must become judge and avenger and sacrifice.

'How doth that happen?' I asked myself. 'What persuadeth living things to obey and command and obey in commanding?'

Now hearken unto my word, ye wisest men! Examine earnestly whether I have stolen into the heart of life itself and unto the roots of its heart!

Wherever I found living matter I found will unto power; and even in the will of the serving, I found the will to be master.

To serve the stronger the weaker is persuaded by its own will which wisheth to be master over what is still weaker. This delight alone it liketh not to miss.

And as the smaller giveth itself up unto the larger, in order to have itself delight from, and power over the smallest: thus even the largest giveth itself up, and for the sake of power risketh—life.

That is the devotion of the largest, to be jeopardy and danger and a casting of dice about death.

And wherever there are sacrifice and services and loving glances, there is will to be master. By secret paths the weaker one stealeth into the castle and unto the heart of the more powerful one—and there stealeth power.

It is true, ye call it will unto procreation or impulse for the end, for the higher, the more remote, the more manifold; but all that is one thing and one secret.

I perish rather than renounce that one thing; and, verily, wherever there is perishing and falling of leaves, behold, life sacrificeth itself—for the sake of power!

That I must be war and becoming and end and the contradiction of the ends—alas, he who findeth out my will, probably findeth out also on what *crooked* ways he hath to walk!

Whatever I create and however I love it, soon afterward I have to be an adversary unto it and unto my love. Thus willeth my will.

And even thou, O perceiver, art but a path and footstep of my will. Verily, my will unto power walketh on the feet of thy will unto truth!

Of course, he who shot after the world of 'will unto existence' did not hit truth. Such a will—doth not exist!

For what existeth not cannot will: but what is in existence how could that strive after existence!

Only where there is life, there is will; but not will unto life, but—thus I teach thee—will unto power!

Many things are valued higher by living things than life itself; but even out of valuing speaketh—will unto power!

Thus life once taught me. And by means of that, ye wisest men, I read you the riddle of your heart.

Verily, I tell you: good and evil, which would be imperishable—do not exist! Of themselves they must ever again surpass themselves.

With your values and words of good and evil ye exercise power, ye valuing ones. And this is your hidden love and the shining, trembling, and overflowing of your soul.

But a stronger power waxeth out of your values, and a new overcoming. On it there break egg and eggshell.

And he who must be a creator in good and evil—verily, he must first be a destroyer, and break values into pieces.

Thus the highest evil is part of the highest goodness. But that is creative goodness.

Let us *speak* thereon, ye wisest men, however bad it be. To be silent is worse; all unuttered truths become poisonous.

And whatever will break on our truths, let it break! Many a house hath yet to be built!"

Thus spake Zarathustra.

## Questions for Discussion

### A. Questions on the Selections

#### *Thomas Hobbes*

1. What evidence does Hobbes offer for affirming a general equality in the faculties of body and mind, despite the clear differences between people in these matters?
2. What experience does Hobbes appeal to in order to confirm his deduction that human beings are naturally apt to invade and destroy one another?
3. Why is there no justice or injustice in the state of nature?
4. What is the basic right of human nature? liberty? a law of nature?
5. What laws of nature take human beings out of the state of nature and into the state of organized government?
6. What obligates human beings to keep the laws and social contracts establishing government? How do these laws obligate?

#### *Plato*

1. What is the purpose of comparing the human individual to a city-state?
2. What is the central problem in discussing the parts of the individual?
3. In order to answer this problem, Socrates states the most basic principle of rationality, the principle of contradiction: that the same thing cannot be in two opposite states at the same time, with respect to the same part of itself, and in relation to the same object. How does Socrates analyze examples which appear to be exceptions in reality to this principle?
4. Why must there be three distinct parts of the soul? Explain.
5. Compare the three parts of the soul to the three parts of the city-state.
6. How does Socrates define justice, courage, wisdom, and temperance for the individual soul?
7. Is justice something imposed on the self by society, or an internal harmonization of the self for Socrates?

*Sartre*

1. Explain the difference between "essence precedes existence" and "existence precedes essence."
2. Explain what Sartre means by "man will be what he will have planned to be. Not what he will want to be."
3. Define "responsibility," "anguish," "forlornness," and "despair" and explain how they are connected with one's basic choice of values.
4. Distinguish two meanings of humanism and identify Sartre's use of existential humanism.

*Marx*

1. How is the worker a commodity in 19th century capitalism?
2. Describe the alienation of the worker from the product of labor.
3. How is the worker alienated from labor as a human action?
4. Describe the differences between animal and human life.
5. How is man a species-being, and how does he possess a species-life?
6. How is man alienated from his species-life?
7. How can labor be a confirmation of man's species-life?
8. Explain how the individual human being can be the social whole of humanity in species-consciousness and species-life.

*Skinner and Rogers*

1. For Skinner, is the science of psychology becoming more successful in understanding, predicting, and controlling behavior?
2. What dangers does Skinner see inherent in the application of psychological techniques of control in the field of government?
3. How does Skinner respond to the objection that the application of his psychological principles in government leads to dictatorship?
4. What points of agreement and points at issue does Rogers see?
5. Distinguish three meanings of "control."
6. Contrast the five elements of the Skinnerian application of science to human behavior with the five elements of the Rogerian view.
7. What is the key argument of Rogers against Skinner's concept of science and value?
8. Does Rogers accept both subjective choice as the core experience in psychotherapy and the objective view of behavior as determined by prior causation?
9. How does Skinner reply to Rogers' concept of self-actualization as not a proof of the reality of freedom of choice?

*Nietzsche*

1. What does Nietzsche mean by the concept of beyond-man?
2. What does Nietzsche mean by the statement "remain faithful to earth"?
3. What is the will unto power?

## B. General Questions for Thought and Discussion

1. Is Hobbes correct in deducing that the state of nature before government is formed must be a state of war? Explain.
2. Do you agree with Hobbes's assumption that the philosopher can state what the nature of man is prior to socialization? For example, is the novel, *Lord of the Flies*, a true description of human nature or a description of human nature deprived of its natural socialization? What can the phrase "human nature" mean?
3. Would you agree with Hobbes that there is no justice or injustice in the original human nature, or are some types of acts immoral whether or not a government prohibits them? Why do you agree or disagree?
4. Assuming Hobbes's description of the original state of human nature, do you agree that the best way of creating peace is that each person be contented with so much liberty against others as he would allow others against himself?
5. Do you agree with Socrates' assumption that there is a basic order to the parts of personality and to human needs which human reason can discover?
6. Do you agree with Socrates that an understanding of the types of people needed in a state can help you understand the structure of the human personality? Develop your comparison to substantiate your answer.
7. Contrast Socrates' and Hobbes's concepts of the natural law.
8. Do you agree or disagree with Sartre that you are responsible for yourself and all humans when you choose your role in life? Explain.
9. Do passions determine character, or do people choose their passions? Develop examples defending or rejecting Sartre's position.
10. Does Sartre contradict himself in replacing a universal essence in human nature with a universality of condition?
11. Is Sartre's concept of human existence more like Hobbes's concept of the state of nature of humanity or more like Socrates' concept of human nature?
12. What essential changes have developed in the relationships between capitalists, workers and the state in 20th century capitalism since the 19th century?
13. Do contemporary advertising and technology alienate people from their essential human needs and turn them into "commodity-people" satisfying less basic needs?
14. Do people determine their economic and social conditions, or do economic and social conditions determine people?
15. Compare Marxist and Existentialist humanism.
16. Could the notion of "self-fulfilling prophecy" be applicable to the question of whether human beings are determined or free? Does the person who believes that his behavior is determined by social conditions treat himself in such a way that his behavior is so determined? Does the person who believes in freedom become free?
17. The objection has been made that the scientific method is a limited way of interpreting reality, permitting the scientist to see and prove only those hypotheses compatible with the assumptions of the scientific method. Both Skinner and Rogers agree that human behavior should be studied under the assumption of science that it is determined by prior causation. Should literature, art, philosophy, or religion assume that human behavior is freely self-determined, or is prior causation?